Anattā

Among the most poorly understood of the Buddhist teachings is the anattā doctrine. Many have interpreted this doctrine as a claim that there is no self, but I argue that this is mistaken. This post defends the view, as put forward by Thanissaro Bhikkhu, that the Buddha teaches the anattā doctrine as a practical strategy, rather than as a metaphysical assertion, and that it ought to be translated as ‘not self’, and not ‘no self’. Furthermore, it presents some of the arguments against the interpretation of this doctrine as a metaphysical assertion, and proposes that the belief in the self is, in fact, justified in Buddhism.

The Linguistic Argument

As noted by Atta Sarana in the online article "The Self and No-Self in Buddhism", the Pali term for 'no self' would be natthattā, not anattā:

Nattha (no) + attā (self)

Atta Sarana notes that this term features in the Samyutta Nikāya, where the Buddha is asked whether there was natthattā, and then rejects the view of nihilism. In contrast, the term anattā would actually translate into English as 'not self', not 'no self':

An (not) + attā (self)

Furthermore, the term is used as an adjective, as below:

"This is anattā."

In fact, the Buddha compiles a list of conditioned phenomena, or khandhas, which one is to view as not self, or anattā. The term, however, is not used in the form below, as a negative determiner:

"There is anattā."

This suggests that the interpretation of anattā as a claim that there is no self is mistaken. Strictly speaking, the Pali term anattā translates into English as 'not self'. Furthermore, its use as an adjective suggests that it is not a metaphysical claim that there is no self, but a practical strategy for recognising that the conditioned khandhas are not self. The Pali term for 'no self' would be natthattā, which the Buddha equated with nihilism and rejected.

The Metaphysical Argument

In her 2002 article "Against No-Ātman Theories of Anattā", Miri Albahari argues that the claim that there is no self is metaphysically fallacious. In particular, it is incompatible with the concept of nibbāna. The state of nibbāna is realised upon the eradication of the conditioned khandhas. It is an unconditioned state, and so is devoid of all conditioned phenomena. Albahari argues that to interpret anattā as a claim that there is no self is to assume that a person is constituted only of the conditioned khandhas. From this assumption, it follows that upon eradication of the conditioned khandhas, nothing would be left to experience nibbāna. This claim is metaphysically incompatible with Buddhist doctrine, as the Buddha states that nibbāna is not a state of annihilation. Therefore, the interpretation of anattā as a claim that there is no self is metaphysically flawed.

There is no dispute that one’s personality is made up of several factors that are in a perpetual state of flux. After all, the physical matter of one’s body is always being lost and replaced, and one’s mental state is always changing. However, there is the question of what is subjectively experiencing this physical body and these mental contents. What is experiencing this perpetual rebirth? Furthermore, when the impermanent khandhas that constitute a personality no longer subsist, what is left to experience nibbāna? It follows that if one is to account for the concept of nibbāna, one must accept the existence of an unconditioned self beyond the conditioned khandhas, for there must be something that realises nibbāna.

Some claim that the concept of the self is an illusion, but I argue that this is also a fallacious claim, for one may ask what actually experiences the illusion. In his Meditations, Descartes argues that one can doubt the reality of the external world on the grounds that it may be no more than an illusion, but one cannot possibly doubt one’s own existence as a thinking being, for the fact that one is doubting inevitably implies that one exists. Indeed, it is conceivable that the phenomena that manifest in one’s experience are illusions, but to dismiss the self as an illusion is senseless, for a subjective self is what is needed to experience the illusion.

The Silence Argument

Throughout the Buddhist scriptures, the Buddha never denies the existence of the self. In fact, he unequivocally rejects nihilism. Therefore, to interpret the doctrine of anattā as a claim that there is no self is unjustified.

It is significant that the Buddha remains silent when Vacchagotta the wanderer asks him whether there is a self. When he is asked by the Venerable Ânanda about his silence regarding Vacchagotta's question, the Buddha states that answering such a metaphysical query would not be conducive to Vacchagotta’s quest for liberation, and that Vacchagotta’s spiritual immaturity would lead him to misinterpret the answer in a way that would bring him further attachment. After all, the Buddha emphasises that one must not blindly believe the words of another to be fact, but should experience the phenomena oneself to discover what is fact. Educationalist Dr Edmond Holmes (1908) suggests that the Buddha remains quiet because the transcendental nature of the self would be beyond the comprehension of Vacchagotta's naïve mind at that stage in his spiritual development. It is apparent, from the plain fact that he is asking the Buddha such a naïve question, that Vacchagotta himself had not discovered the nature of the self, and so, seeing this, the Buddha refuses to give an answer. He later explains to the Venerable Ânanda that giving an answer to his question would only bring Vacchagotta confusion, since his naïve mind would misunderstand the answer, and this, in turn, would have adverse effects on his struggle for liberation.

In contrast, when asked by Mogharaja how one must view the world if one is to go beyond death, the Buddha does not hesitate to answer. He tells Mogharaja that one must not identify oneself with or be attached to phenomena that are not self. Here, the Buddha is not making an ontological assertion, but is teaching a technique of perception aimed at liberating oneself from the attachment to conditioned phenomena, by learning that they are not self. The fact that the Buddha gives a very clear answer to Mogharaja’s practical question but refuses to answer Vacchagotta’s metaphysical question suggests that the anattā doctrine is not an ontological assertion, but a practical strategy for the attainment of liberation.

The Affirmative Argument

As well as rejecting nihilism, there is evidence that the Buddha actually affirms the existence of the self. This is particularly evident in the Mahāparinirvāna Sutrā, which contains the doctrine of the tathāgatagarbha, the true self within each and every being, which is unconditioned and fundamentally eternal. This true unconditioned self is distinguished from the conditioned illusory ego, which is formed from the khandas. Furthermore, it is taught that the rejection of this doctrine is metaphysically wrong and linked to adverse kammic consequences.

Other suttas in which the existence of the self is confirmed include the Anguttara Nikāya, which states that there is an unconditioned consciousness that is released from the cycle of samsāra upon the attainment of nibbāna. Furthermore, the state of nibbāna is frequently described in positive terms, for example, as "bliss supreme" in the Dhammapada, and as "the wonderful" and "the pure" in the Samyutta Nikāya. The fact that nibbāna is described as a positive experience implies that there is more to one's being after the eradication of the conditioned khandhas, for there is something that experiences this positive state. Therefore, the positive description of nibbāna implies the existence of an unconditioned self that is separate from the conditioned khandhas.

Conclusions

It appears that Thanissaro Bhikkhu’s proposal that the anattā doctrine is not meant to be interpreted as a metaphysical assertion is entirely reasonable, for not only is the denial of the self metaphysically fallacious, but, as has been alluded to in the preceding paragraph, metaphysical assertions affirming the existence of the self are also present in Buddhism. Instead, I advocate the idea that the anattā doctrine is a practical strategy that involves letting go of one’s attachment to the conditioned khandhas, through realising that they are impermanent, and, therefore, do not constitute the true unconditioned self.

References

• Albahari M (2002). "Against No-Ātman Theories of Anattā". Asian Philosophy, 12:1, 5-20.
• Atta Sarana (c. 2000). "Self and No-Self in Buddhism". Helium.
• Descartes R (1641). Meditations.
• Holmes E (1908). The Creed of Buddha. New York: John Lane.
• Thanissaro Bhikkhu (1993). "The Not-Self Strategy". Insight.
• Thanissaro Bhikkhu (1996). Noble Strategy: Essays on the Buddhist Path. Metta Forest Monastery.
  

Induction

Induction is a type of reasoning that extrapolates knowledge about the observed to make conclusions about the unobserved. An inductive argument usually takes the following form:

All observed X have been Y.
Therefore,
All X are Y.

This is a very important method of reasoning in science and in common sense. In science, it is used to formulate hypotheses from data, and to make predictions. In common sense, it is used to make safe judgements about the world around us. Despite our reliance on induction, it has been attacked several times. The following arguments illustrate some of the problems of induction.

The Pyrrhonian Critique

Arguments against the validity of induction can be traced back to the Pyrrhonian skeptic Sextus Empiricus, who argued that a universal law cannot be established from from an incomplete set of individual instances. This can be because of two reasons. The first is the use of a poor method. An induction may be based on a sample that is not representative of the general population, and so the conclusion may be false. For example, a doctor may observe that all of the patients in the oncology ward have cancer, and make the following claim:

All observed people in the ward have cancer.
Therefore,
All people have cancer.

Clearly, the doctor has made an erroneous claim. His sample is not representative of the general population, and so the induction drawn from it is unsound.

The second reason why a universal law cannot be established from an incomplete set of individual instances is that in an inductive argument, there is no logical entailment between the premises and the conclusion. Induction takes a finite set of observations and infers a new claim based. This new claim is a conjecture based on the observations, and is not logically entailed by them.

Consider the following inductive argument:

The sun has risen every morning so far.
Therefore,
The sun will rise every morning.

Although the sun is likely to rise every morning, there is no logical entailment from the fact that it always has to the claim that it will continue to do so. It is logically conceivable that in a possible world in which the sun has risen every day so far, the sun will not rise tomorrow.

The Problem of Justification

The problem of justification was described by David Hume in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748). Hume argued that one cannot justify the method of induction without using induction. Therefore, all justifications are circular.

Consider the previous argument concerning the rising sun. One could that whenever I had previously induced that the sun would rise the following day, my experience of it actually rising the following day confirmed the validity of my induction. Therefore, I continue to assume that the sun will rise tomorrow, because this assumption has been right so far. However, as Hume shrewdly argues, this provides no justification whatsoever, for what is being said is that induction has been valid so far, and, on this basis, I conclude that induction will continue be valid. We can see that this statement, itself, is an inductive inference:

Induction has so far been successful.
Therefore,
Induction will always be successful.

This argument attempts to justify induction via induction, and so fails due to a vicious circularity. Thus, Hume has shown that we have no metaphysical justification for our inductive practices.

Some argue that this circularity is benign. However, consider the counter-inductivist who uses counter-induction as his preferred method of reasoning. A typical counter-inductive argument has the following form:

All observed X have been Y.
Therefore,
All other X are not Y.

Let us now apply counter-induction to formulate a hypothesis about the success of counter-induction:

Counter-induction so far has been unsuccessful.
Therefore,
Counter-induction will in future be successful.

It appears that if the inductivist can use a circular justification to support induction, the counter-inductivist can also use the same argument to support counter-induction.

The Grue Paradox

Nelson Goodman has presented a different attack against inductive reasoning. He introduces an adjective, grue. Something is grue if it is green before the year 2100 and blue afterwards. Now, consider that it is the year 2009, and we have observed all emeralds so far to be green. The following inductive statement can be made:

All emeralds so far have been green.
Therefore,
All emeralds are green.

However, since it is before 2100, our observations also support the following statement:

All emeralds so far have been grue.
Therefore,
All emeralds are grue.

This suggests that the same observations support two incompatible hypotheses about emeralds observed after 2100. The first hypothesis is that all emeralds will be green after 2100. The second hypothesis is that all emeralds are grue, and so will be blue after 2100. Therefore, induction cannot select one hypothesis over another.

The Raven Paradox

Proposed by Carl Gustav Hempel, this paradox illustrates how inductive logic can violate intuition. Consider the following hypothesis:

All ravens are black.

Evidence supporting this hypothesis would be a specific observable instance of the general class, or, in other words, a black raven.

Note that the hypothesis stated above is logically equivalent to the following hypothesis:

All non-black things are not ravens.

Evidence supporting this hypothesis would be a non-black thing that is not a raven. For example, a piece of white paper is non-black and not a raven. Therefore a piece of white paper supports the above hypothesis. However, since both hypotheses are logically equivalent, it follows that a piece of white paper provides supportive evidence for the hypothesis that all ravens are black.

Conclusions

Induction is a crucial method of reasoning in everyday life. Furthermore, the construction of physical theories and postulation of laws in science also presupposes the validity of inductive reasoning. However, the problems of induction presented here reveal that inductive reasoning has no metaphysical justification. This raises questions about the nature of the knowledge generated through inductive reasoning.

Perhaps a sensible position to take is reliabilism. Although induction has no justification, it is a reliable method, and so its conclusions can be trusted, at least from a pragmatic point of view. Indeed, there is no logical entailment that the sun has to rise tomorrow, but I can assume that it will, because the method I have used to make this assumption is reliable. Furthermore, it is more pragmatic for me at this present time to assume that the sun will rise tomorrow than to make extensive preparations for the forthcoming darkness.

References

• Goodman N (1955). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
• Hempel CG (1945). "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation". Mind, 54:213, 1.
• Hume D (1748). An Enquiry Concerning Human Unerstanding.
• Sextus Empiricus (c. 200). Outlines of Pyrrhonism.